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A B S T R A C T   
Scholarly discourse on “disruptive technologies” has been strongly influenced by disruptive innovation theory. 
This theory is tailored for analyzing disruptions in markets and business. It is of limited use, however, in 
analyzing the broader social, moral and existential dynamics of technosocial disruption. Yet these broader dy-
namics should be of great scholarly concern, both in coming to terms with technological disruptions of the past 
and those of our current age. Technologies can disrupt social relations, institutions, epistemic paradigms, 
foundational concepts, values, and even the nature of human cognition and experience – domains of disruption 
that are largely neglected in existing discourse on disruptive technologies. Accordingly, this paper seeks to 
reorient scholarly discussion around a broader notion of technosocial disruption. This broader notion raises three 
foundational questions. First, how can technosocial disruption be conceptualized in a way that clearly sets it 
apart from the disruptive innovation framework? Secondly, how does the notion of technosocial disruption relate 
to the concordant notions of “disruptor” and “disruptiveness”? Thirdly, can we advance criteria to assess the 
“degree of social disruptiveness” of different technologies? The paper clarifies these questions and proposes an 
answer to each of them. In doing so, it advances “technosocial disruption” as a key analysandum for future 
scholarship on the interactions between technology and society.   
1. Introduction 
Clayton Christensen’s [1,2] disruptive innovation theory has had a 
strong influence on the way that “disruptive technologies” are concep-
tualized, both in colloquial and scholarly discourse. On Christensen’s 
account, novel technologies can prompt the destruction of existing 
supply chains and business models, thereby disrupting markets and in-
dustries. While Christensen’s theoretical framework is still prevalent in 
economics and business studies, recent scholars have voiced calls for a 
more encompassing understanding of disruptive technologies [3–7]. 
With its focus on processes of market disruption, disruptive innovation 
theory does little to illuminate the broader dynamics of social trans-
formation engendered by new technologies. Yet understanding these 
broader dynamics is of substantial scholarly importance, as is apparent 
from the societal promises and anxieties surrounding emerging tech-
nologies that are often characterized as “disruptive”, such as AI, genome 
editing, synthetic biology, robotics, smart sensors, 3D-printing, big data 
analytics, virtual reality, and many more (e.g. [8–10]. 
Going beyond disruptive innovation theory, an understanding of 
technological disruption is needed that is not limited to markets and 
business, but that also serves to illuminate how technologies can disrupt 
social relations, institutions, epistemic paradigms, foundational con-
cepts, values, and the very nature of human cognition and experience.1 
In order to clearly disentangle this broader understanding from Chris-
tensen’s account, in this article I refer to technological disruption in this 
broad sense as “technosocial disruption”, and to technologies that play a 
major role in the dynamics of technosocial disruption as “socially 
disruptive technologies” (SDTs). The aim of the paper is to clarify these 
notions and to develop the conceptual framework associated with them, 
to arrive at a better understanding of the interactions between tech-
nology and society. 
Prior to doing so, let me highlight a few more considerations to 
strengthen the case for reorienting discourse on disruption along said 
lines. I discern five interlocking reasons for why doing so is an important 
undertaking. First, “disruption” and its cognates “disruptor”, “disruptee” 
and “disruptiveness” have proven to be a helpful vocabulary to describe 
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and analyze the interactions between technology and society. This has 
been recognized by previous scholars [5,11] and is evidenced by the fact 
that colloquial discourse on technosocial disruption is becoming 
increasingly prevalent, suggesting a natural affinity between the lan-
guage of disruption and attempts to conceptualize the interactions be-
tween technology and society. Secondly, these processes are high on the 
radar of ethicists as well as those of policymakers (e.g. [12], who often 
grapple with effective means of governance in the face of technosocial 
disruption. The societal relevance of the topic warrants scholarly 
engagement. Thirdly, extant discourse has clear limitations: Chris-
tensen’s operationalization of disruptive technologies has several pe-
culiarities, which do not easily mash with a more encompassing notion 
of SDTs (see section 2). Fourthly, as of yet this broader notion has not 
been singled out as a self-standing topic of scholarly analysis (see section 
3). Plausibly, scholarly work on the topic has been inhibited by the 
omnipresence of disruptive innovation theory, which may have served 
as a limiting example and hampered efforts to theorize about techno-
logical disruption beyond the spheres of market and business. Fifthly, to 
the extent that scholars have engaged with the topic of technosocial 
disruption, they have not supplied it with clear conceptual foundations. 
The authors of a recent typology of disruption in the legal sphere even 
contend that what makes something disruptive “is never going to be 
precisely definable” [7]. 
I argue to the contrary. Technosocial disruption may be a complex 
notion, but its multidimensionality and cross-disciplinary application 
should not discourage attempts to define it. Not only is it possible to come 
up with an integrative definition, but there is much to gain from doing 
so. An overarching notion of technosocial disruption can serve to unify 
scholarly understanding, bridging the dispersed analyses of technolog-
ical disruption that have emerged in the wake of Christensen’s theory (e. 
g. [3,6,7]. Furthermore, it can stimulate theoretical and conceptual 
progress, by generating an appropriate conceptual toolkit to analyze 
salient dynamics of technosocial change. 
One might object that a conceptual focus on disruption is not strictly 
required to analyze these dynamics. They can also be analyzed in terms 
of the related notion of transformation [13,14], or perhaps by adopting a 
different vocabulary altogether. Be that as it may, I maintain that the 
defensive move of conceding all the “disruptive technology” terminol-
ogy to disruptive innovation theory, while adopting an altogether 
different conceptual framework for disruptions beyond the domains of 
markets and business, is inadequate. As noted above, this concessive 
move is being put under pressure by colloquial discourse, in which 
disruptive technologies are commonly associated with exactly the kind 
of “technosocial disruptions” that this paper addresses, but that are 
peripheral to disruptive innovation theory. Therefore, the concession is 
likely to lead to confusion, as it results in the failure to articulate a 
conceptual framework that can vindicate colloquial appeals to techno-
logical disruption. Furthermore, it leaves us intellectually impoverished, 
as it results in a failure to develop and integrate existing discourses. For 
instance, it blocks the prospect of differentiating between the nuances of 
“technosocial transformation” on the one hand and “technosocial 
disruption” on the other (see section 4). Therefore, even if the concep-
tual toolkit of “disruption” is not the only means to conceptualize the 
dynamics of technosocial change, there is good reason to develop this 
toolkit nonetheless. 
In terms of conceptual approach, two general pressures will affect the 
course of the ensuing analysis. On the one hand, I take it that a fruitful 
account of technosocial disruption should align fairly closely with 
colloquial discourse: the technical term should not stray too far from 
ordinary connotations of “technology” and “disruption”. Capturing 
shared public opinion may not be the only desideratum when engineering 
scholarly concepts, but if a technical term can be brought in line with 
ordinary language and colloquial intuitions, then all the better for it. 
Arguably, this is precisely what Christensen has failed to do, thereby 
inhibiting the promise of his theory in coming to terms with processes of 
disruption in general [15]. On the other hand, a fruitful 
conceptualization of SDTs should be conducive to further theorizing, for 
instance by weeding out inconsistencies that may be present in collo-
quial accounts, and by explicitly positioning itself in relation to existing 
theoretical frameworks. 
I proceed as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of how 
disruptive technologies are commonly understood, and how the concept 
has been developed in the context of disruptive innovation theory. 
Section 3 points to shortcomings of this framework and its successors, 
highlighting important dimensions of technosocial disruption that are 
not captured by existing theories. Section 4 prepares the conceptual 
groundwork for a broader notion of “technosocial disruption”, thereby 
clarifying the relation between “disruption”, “transformation” and 
“change”. Section 5 outlines seven key criteria for assessing the degree of 
a technology’s “social disruptiveness”. Section 6 concludes by stressing 
the promise of further research on SDTs. 
2. Etymological and theoretical roots: disruptive technologies 
and disruptive innovation theory 
The term “disruption” has its roots in the Latin verb disrumpere, 
which was originally used as a medical term, referring to the process of 
breaking (rumpere) apart (dis). In classifying wounds of different kinds, 
the 16th century surgeon Thomas Gale, who authored the first book on 
surgery in English, made mention of “a wounde disrupted or broken”, as 
distinct from a mere cut [16]; p. 100). The semantic field widened in the 
centuries thereafter, taking on ecclesiastical connotations among others: 
“The Great Disruption” of 1843 was a landmark event in Scottish church 
history. It was not until halfway the 20th century, however, that 
“disrupt” and “disruption” became part of the daily lexicon. Google 
Ngram reveals that mention of disruption and its cognates became 
common in written works during the postwar decades. The concept of 
“disruptive technology” was very rarely used up until the 1990s, when 
Christensen popularized the term. 
In the wake of Christensen’s influential theorizing, definitions of 
disruption have bifurcated into a colloquial and a technical counterpart. 
On dictionary definitions, the meaning of the verb “to disrupt” can be 
spelled out as follows:  
• To prevent something, especially a system, process, or event, from 
continuing as usual or as expected (Cambridge dictionary);  
• To break apart; to throw into disorder; to interrupt the normal course or 
unity of; to cause upheaval in (Merriam-Webster dictionary). 
Hence, in common parlance disruption is strongly associated with 
disturbance, disorder, turmoil and destruction. As such, disruptive 
processes are often negatively evaluated. A further feature that has been 
pointed out is that disruptions are typically prompted by external stimuli 
[12]. Disruptive change does not come from within the system but is 
forced upon it. 
The technical notion of disruption, as advanced by Christensen, di-
verges from this colloquial concept in several respects. First, it does so by 
being theory-laden: disruption, on a technical understanding, is strongly 
associated with disruptive innovation theory. Secondly, its application is 
restricted to the domains of market and business. Thirdly, disruption 
sensu Christensen has developed a decidedly positive connotation [4]. In 
contemporary business circles – and especially among Big Tech com-
panies – disruptive technologies, and the associated notion of “creative 
destruction” [17], are hailed as aspirations. For instance, up until 2014 
“move fast and break things” was the internal motto used by Facebook, 
reflected in its drive to overturn antiquated business models, as well as 
social and legal norms [12]. 
The roots of Christensen’s use of the term disruption go back to his 
PhD-thesis (1992) [45], but in his writings over the subsequent two 
decades he has further developed, refined and somewhat altered his 
terminology. This happened partly in response to criticisms that his 
terminology was insufficiently precise, inconsistent, and invited 
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confusion [15,18–20]. At a conceptual level, the most consequential 
change in Christensen’s work has been a shift from his initial emphasis 
on disruptive technology to a later emphasis on disruptive innovation [2, 
5]. While the latter concept better captures Christensen’s theoretical 
focus, the original concept [21] has – somewhat unfortunately – stuck 
with many commentators. 
Christensen contrasts disruptive technologies with sustaining tech-
nologies (see Fig. 1). Sustaining technologies, sensu Christensen, derive 
their market-success from incrementally improving attributes of prod-
ucts or services that customers already value. Disruptive technologies, 
by contrast, introduce new attributes that initially appeal only to a fringe 
market, but are eventually key to its success. This is the counterintuitive 
thesis at the core of Christensen’s theory: disruptive innovations do not 
start with introducing better products in existing markets. By contrast, 
existing customers initially judge the products of disruptive market 
entrants to be worse. But while incumbent firms focus on serving pre- 
existing consumer needs, new entrants can quickly capture a large 
market share by serving needs that did not previously exist. Subse-
quently, this allows successful new entrants to challenge incumbents, 
typically by offering products that are cheaper, simpler, smaller and 
more convenient to use. Christensen’s example of choice is the evolution 
of the floppy disk. Although not initially delivering superior perfor-
mance, small floppy disks acquired an increasing market share and 
eventually exceeded the demands of the original market [21]. What 
counts as a disruptive innovation, then, is relative to the historical tra-
jectory of a given product, market, or business context: the fact that a 
new service or product is an initial outlier is part of what makes its 
subsequent success disruptive. 
Two observations about Christensen’s account and his influence on 
scholarly discourse are particularly relevant for present purposes. First, 
on Christensen’s understanding, disruption should be understood in a 
rather restricted sense. The criteria to be classified as a disruptor sensu 
Christensen are stringent, and often conflict with ordinary uses of term. 
For instance, colloquial ascriptions notwithstanding, Christensen et al. 
[22] explicitly argue that the influence of Uber on the taxi market does 
not qualify as a genuinely disruptive technology, since the services Uber 
provides are largely consonant with those of the traditional taxi business 
(but see [23]). Secondly, it is clear that even though Christensen made 
the first claim to the concept of “disruptive technology”, the theoretical 
toolkit he provides is not specifically tailored for articulating this notion 
beyond the domains of market and business. To come to terms with the 
broader dynamics of technosocial disruption a different theoretical 
framework is called for. 
3. Towards a broader account of disruptive technologies 
Various phenomena that are colloquially described as instances of 
technological disruption are not designated as such by disruptive inno-
vation theory, since they do not pertain to disruptions of markets and 
industries, but to other domains of human existence and social life. 
Consider the emerging practice of teleworking enabled by video 
conferencing software, the new ways in which people maintain friend-
ships in the online sphere, or the changing styles of political commu-
nication afforded by social media [24]. What is disrupted, here, are not 
merely products or services, but daily human routines and basic social 
and political practices. Accordingly, dissatisfied with its limitations of 
scope, a few theorists have sought to extend the notion of disruptive 
technology beyond the confines of Christensen’s work, specifically by 
looking at disruptions in the digital sphere. 
Some of the broader dynamics of technosocial disruption – specif-
ically those that pertain to the legal sphere – are addressed by Liu et al. 
[7], who present a two-phase model for understanding the legal 
disruption precipitated by AI. The first phase is constituted by what they 
call the “disruptive moment”, which comes about when technologies 
generate, reveal or unlock new affordances, when such affordances are 
acted upon, and when the resulting behaviour is deemed a legal problem 
or hazard. The second phase involves the ensuing process of legal 
development, displacement, or destruction. For instance, with regard to 
legal development, AI might generate legal gaps that require new legal 
rules; it might lead to legal uncertainty; it might lead to existing laws 
having a wrong scope of application; or it might lead to obsolescence of 
existing legal provisions (idem, p. 104; see also [25]. The authors offer a 
rich conceptual framework for analysing legal disruption as a standalone 
phenomenon. However, their account does not provide much clarifica-
tion of the concept of disruption itself, which the authors take to be too 
fuzzy and context-dependent to be analysable. 
The most comprehensive account of technosocial disruption to date 
is formulated by Schuelke-Leech [3]. Schuelke-Leech ties her work to 
disruptive innovation theory by distinguishing between two levels of 
technological disruption. A first-order disruption is a localized change 
within a market or industry – disruption in Christensen’s sense. 
Second-order disruptions affect a much broader range of societal norms 
and operations, including social relationships, organizational structures, 
institutions, public policies and the physical environment. 
Schuelke-Leech (p. 270) outlines four characteristics of technologies 
that qualify as second-order disruptive:  
1. [They] are non-localized, dynamic developments of fundamental 
technologies, often combining numerous individual technologies;  
2. [They] have wide-spread applications in different industries; 
3. [They] restructure, reorganize, disrupt current social and institu-
tional norms and standards, operations, production, trends, not 
limited to a particular market or industry;  
4. [They] do not drive economy-wide growth (…), [but] may combine 
resulting in a Kondratieff long wave. 
One of the virtues of Schuelke-Leech’s analysis that it clearly posi-
tions itself in relation to the earlier work of Christensen, as well as that of 
Schumpeter [17], who coined the term “Kondratieff long wave” (see also 
[26]. Yet her account still overlooks some of the most interesting – and 
understudied – aspects of technosocial change: the way in which tech-
nologies disrupt human knowledge and cognition, moral norms and 
Fig. 1. The distinction between disruptive and sustaining technologies according to Christensen’s disruptive innovation theory. Examples i.a. from [2,22].  
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values, as well as fundamental concepts and categories of thought [27]. 
Emerging technologies have a potential to disrupt human nature, 
social life, and nature itself at a fundamental level. “Deep technologies” 
reach down into the very nature of things to refigure them for human 
purposes [47,48]. Established natural boundaries and entrenched social 
categories are thereby challenged. This is not altogether new: technol-
ogy has also exerted such pressures in the past. Writing, for instance, has 
changed how we think; the printing press marked a new era in human’s 
cognitive evolution. Yet the variety of currently emerging deep tech-
nologies certainly makes deep disruptions, which put into question what 
were previously held as “fixed points” about human nature, human so-
ciety, and the natural world, a topic of specific current concern. Syn-
thethic biology allows for the creation of organisms that, for the first 
time in billions of years, have not been created through Darwinian 
evolution but human intelligence. Neurotechnology implants hold 
promise to fundamentally alter modes of experience and cognition, 
while AI is challenging various epistemic practices. And just like tech-
nologies can change our epistemic outlook, they can also change moral 
norms, values, identities and agency (e.g. [30,31]). 
Or consider the disruption of fundamental categories and concepts of 
thought. The dichotomy between being “dead” and “alive” comprises a 
fundamental distinction along such lines, which was put under pressure 
by the mechanical ventilator [32–34] - just like the distinction between 
“surviving” and “extinct” is currently being put under pressure by 
de-extinction technologies. Gene-technology creates hybrid “monsters” 
that cross settled basic ontological boundaries (e.g. [35] and force us to 
rethink our classifications. AI and machine learning technologies put 
pressure on fundamental concepts, such as human agency, personhood, 
autonomy and creativity. Socially constructed kinds, including human 
identities and human nature, are being challenged by technologies. This 
foundational aspect of technosocial disruption is also one of its least 
studied aspects. 
Disruption, here, manifests itself in the overturning of stably 
entrenched norms, practices, as well as concepts. These examples of 
technosocial disruption go much deeper than both Christensen and more 
recent theorists of disruption have allowed for. Yet a good case can be 
made that deep disruptions, which instigate processes of fundamentally 
remaking our society and ourselves, should take center stage in future 
scholarship, especially since deep disruptions raise issues that ethicists 
are grappling with and that are of clear societal importance. Arguably, 
interest in these disruptions should be all the greater because of the 
foundational theoretical challenges SDTs provoke, and their challenge 
to extant methods and approaches for analyzing the interplay between 
technology and society [27]. Disruptive technologies make us lose our 
normative, theoretical and conceptual bearings. They generate theo-
retical uncertainty, similar to what Gardiner [36] describes as the 
“theoretical storm” that haunts the ethics of climate change. Even our 
best moral theories face severe difficulties conceptualizing basic issues 
regarding the problems of long-term climate change. Similarly, even our 
best theories in the philosophy and ethics of technology have trouble to 
come to terms with SDTs. 
Consider, once more, processes of conceptual disruption. Several 
currently emerging technologies challenge basic concepts of ethical and 
philosophical discourse, such as “autonomy”, “agency”, “identity” and 
“reality”. They put pressure on dichotomies like “natural vs. artificial”, 
“self vs. other”, “organism vs. artefact”. These concepts and di-
chotomies, in turn, are deeply engrained in ethical and philosophical 
discourse. Reassessing their meaning in the face of technological pres-
sures involves a reassessment of basic building blocks of ethical theo-
rizing, and indeed, of human sense-making and self-understanding. 
Analyzing these “deep disruptions” transcends previous work on 
disruptive technologies. Furthermore, it calls for renewed analysis of the 
notion of disruption itself. How to conceptualize the phenomenon of 
disruption, in a way that is conducive to further theorizing in this field? 
4. Socially disruptive technologies: A new conceptual 
framework 
As Schuelke-Leech [3] points out, one of the challenges in concep-
tualizing disruptive technologies is to pinpoint where the disruption 
really begins. Novel techniques, procedures, artifacts and applications 
might instigate a process of disruption, but so might new ideas or soci-
etal challenges. Consider the most prominent socially disruptive event of 
the recent past: the Covid-19 pandemic. Here social disruption was not 
instigated by new technologies, but by a pandemic. Much of the societal 
response to this social disruption, however, has been strongly 
technology-driven, including the search for medical treatment and 
vaccines, the introduction of contact tracing apps and the widespread 
adoption of video-conferencing software to facilitate online collabora-
tion [12]. Indeed, the pandemic has initiated a global experiment in 
smart living [37]. Even in disruptive processes that were not initially 
triggered by technologies, SDTs might nonetheless play an important 
part in the subsequent dynamics. Indeed, the dynamics between tech-
nology and society are typically tightly interwoven when it comes to 
processes of disruption. Causal schemas which strictly distinguish be-
tween technological and non-technological agents may be of limited use. 
Instead, the entangled sociotechnical dynamics should be the core focus 
of interest. 
A first conceptual lesson, then, is that technosocial disruption is a 
contextual notion. Not only is it bound to sociohistorical contexts, but 
also to specific industries, business sectors, and groups in society. A 
technology might be disruptive for some, but not for others. Smart 
organs-on-a-chip may positively disrupt the lives of vulnerable health 
groups, whereas they do not provide any specific support to the popu-
lation at large. Advanced battery storage technologies may serve to 
relieve power shortages in the Global South, which do not exist in the 
Global North. 
Additionally, note that disruption is never intrinsic to the technology 
itself. Instead, it depends on the complex interplay between a technol-
ogy and a given social context. That said, the disruptiveness of arche-
typical SDTs will typically be invariant to a great many of social 
contexts. Consider deepfakes, health care robots or artificial meat. In 
communities of many kinds these emerging technologies are likely to 
engender noticeable social disruptions. Their disruptive potential man-
ifests itself in conditions that are fairly basic to society and entrenched in 
social structures. 
4.1. Disruptors and disruptees 
Adopting Christensen’s terminology, processes of disruption involve 
both a “disruptor” and a “disruptee”. Mindful of this distinction, note 
that there is a subtle difference between the notions “disruptive tech-
nologies” and “technological disruption”. The former notion fore-
grounds technology as the driver of disruption, whereas the latter notion 
leaves open whether technology acts as a disruptor or is being disrupted. 
For apart from being agents of disruption, technologies can also be 
disrupted themselves: new technologies can overtake existing ones, 
change fields of industry and engineering, converge with related – or 
unrelated – technologies, transform into general purpose technologies, 
and make existing artifacts, procedures, and applications obsolete. 
Paradigmatic SDTs bring along disruptions at the level of technology 
as well as society. Nuclear technology is an example here: its deployment 
of techniques for the fission of atomic nuclei led to an entirely new field 
of engineering, but the emergence of nuclear technology also had a 
transformative impact on warfare and international politics. In princi-
ple, however, technosocial disruption may have a pronounced social 
component, while only barely influencing existing fields of technology 
and industry. Carlsen et al. [11] give the development of airplanes as an 
example. Energy efficient airliners, incrementally improving in capac-
ity, speed, and cost-efficiency, have given rise to major changes in so-
ciety. The techniques of industrial production, however, did not involve 
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any radical alterations, but evolved along a path of incremental tech-
nological improvement. 
Conversely, technological disruption can also occur mostly the level 
of industry, while having only moderate social implications. Carlsen 
et al. [11] present anti-lock brakes and the self-supporting body in the 
automobile industry as an example. Their development in the 1970s 
involved radical technology changes to the automobile industry, but did 
not lead to a corresponding change in user experience or have sub-
stantial societal implications. 
4.2. Disruption, transformation, innovation and revolution 
Disruption and transformation can be regarded as modalities of 
change. While all processes of social disruption involve dramatic social 
change (cf. [38], not all processes of social change are equally disrup-
tive. Social transformations are typically regarded as structural and 
systemic, affecting foundational structures of society. Their formative 
nature implies that transformations cannot easily be reversed or be 
made undone, as Gruetzemacher and Whittlestone [13] underscore: 
transformation engenders irreversibility. Contrasted with the notion of 
transformation, the notion of disruption foregrounds the reactive mode 
in the face of change. Disruptions are more likely to be rapid, unantic-
ipated, causing rupture and uncertainty. Rather than a change of form, it 
describes a mode of change in which the form is not yet settled (cf [34]. 
The relation between disruption and transformation may be oper-
ationalized in context-specific ways. For instance, in the context of 
organizational transitions, Suarez and Oliva [39] outline a typology of 
environmental change, where disruptive change has the specific attri-
butes of being infrequent, developing gradually and having high in-
tensity effects (see also [40]. As discussed, the qualifier “disruptive” is 
also frequently used to describe processes of innovation. “Innovation” 
and “technology” are distinct concepts, however, and there are good 
reasons to dissociate them [41]. For instance, innovation discourse has 
the process level as its point of departure, whereas technology discourse 
is tilted towards the product level. This provides further reason to 
analyze the nature of disruptive technologies beyond the bounds of 
disruptive innovation theory. It also suggests a tension in the concept of 
“disruptive technology”, understood as a process-qualification attrib-
uted to a product-notion. 
Another mode of change with which disruption may be contrasted is 
that of revolution. In his recent work on moral revolutions, Baker [42] 
underscores the elements of intentionality, agency, and activism that 
underly moral revolutions. Moral disruptions, by contrast, need not be 
intentionally driven. To complicate matters, technologies do often play a 
prominent role in radical social change, including revolutionary changes 
driven by social activism [46]. To the extent that an autonomous dy-
namic of technological forces is regarded as a key driver of radical social 
change, this is naturally couched in terms of social disruption. If 
goal-intended human agency is the main driver of radical change, it is 
naturally couched in terms of revolution. 
4.3. Disruptors good and bad 
As noted, on Christensen’s understanding disruption is hailed as an 
aspiration of incumbent firms: market disruption has decidedly positive 
connotations. By contrast, in its recent legislative proposal for an Arti-
ficial Intelligence Act [43], the European Commission uses the term 
“disruption” to refer to societal risks that warrant caution. The valence 
of technosocial disruption, it appears, is context-bound. There is no 
conceptual constraint on whether technosocial disruption should be 
evaluated in positive or negative terms. Technosocial disruption may 
either be regarded as desirable or undesirable – and depending on 
context, its evaluation might also be mixed or changeable. For as said, 
different groups can be affected by SDTs, both in space and time. 
The ‘goodness’ of market disruptions is prudential, rather than 
moral. In fact, market disruptions are not typically evaluated in moral 
terms. Technosocial disruptions, by contrast, often invite ethical 
reflection. This has to do, in part, with the foundational nature of 
technosocial disruption: if technologies touch upon the very essence of 
politics, social life, human experience and human nature, then ethical 
reflection is called for. Moreover, technosocial disruptions may come 
along with an unequal distribution of costs, benefits, and risks, thereby 
raising issues of justice. These unequal divisions typically befall on 
specific groups, creating a schism, for instance, between young and old, 
healthy and ill, rich and poor, employed and unemployed, lowly and 
highly skilled, and current and future generations. 
4.4. Disruption and disruptiveness 
SDTs can be identified either on the basis of their potential or their 
actual impact. Naturally, SDTs that have been operative in history can be 
pinpointed with greater confidence than currently emerging disruptive 
technologies. How socially disruptive the dynamics of currently 
emerging technologies will turn out to be is difficult to predict. Foresight 
analysis may accidently serve to hype the potential of certain SDTs, 
while the potential of others is overlooked. That said, technologies of 
which the disruptive potential has not yet been actualized should not be 
excluded from a definition of SDTs. Doing so would make an analysis of 
SDTs a merely historical exercise, with limited relevance for under-
standing present-day societal dynamics. 
The distinction between actual and potential impact is mirrored in 
uses of the terms disruption and disruptiveness. When speaking of the 
social disruption of a given technology, we denote an actual change the 
technology has made in a given social constellation. Social disruption 
can be understood as the breaking down of a stable societal equilibrium 
or entrenched state-of-affairs, for instance with regard to social norms 
and institutions, or with regard to concepts, values, practices and re-
lations. But when speaking of the social disruptiveness of a given tech-
nology, we typically refer to the technology’s potential to disrupt. 
Analyzing this potential can be a useful tool for theorizing, especially in 
reflecting on emerging technologies of which the disruptive potential 
can be estimated, but which have not left historical traces that allow for 
an assessment of their concrete impact. For purposes of ethically 
assessing emerging technologies, therefore, it may be most fruitful to 
focus on the concept of disruptiveness. 
4.5. SDTs versus SSTs 
As said, the actual disruption of a technology might be understood in 
terms of a historical status quo, a stable developmental trajectory, or an 
equilibrium regarding a society’s social and normative structure, which 
technosocial dynamics serve to upset. An apparent counterexample to 
this characterization comes from technologies which have a major in-
fluence on society, but simultaneously serve to sustain, rather than 
disrupt, an existing status quo. Consider green energy technologies. 
Prima facie, these constitute a plausible candidate to be designated as 
SDTs. However, the societal influence they exert is in an important sense 
that of sustaining existing practices, rather than disrupting them. After 
all, green energy technologies facilitate a continuation of living energy- 
intensive lifestyles, and of doing so without substantially altering the 
global carbon cycle. But if green energy technologies serve to sustain the 
status quo, then how can they be designated as SDTs? 
The answer to this puzzle is that the status quo alluded to is a 
contextual notion. SDTs do not serve to disrupt each and every stable 
societal constellation. To the contrary, for each SDT there will inevitably 
be certain practices that it serves to sustain. But this does not preclude 
the qualification of a technology as SDT, as long as there is some 
important equilibrium that its dynamics serve to alter. Consider that 
another status quo of human societies, at least since the Industrial 
Revolution, has been to generate energy from non-renewable resources. 
This is a status quo that green energy technologies do serve to upset, 
fueling the intuition that they should be classified as SDT. 
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This analysis foregrounds that the disruption of a technology cannot 
be equated with its causal influence on society. It might well be the case 
that a given technology has major causal influence, such that if the 
technology did not exist, social structures would be radically different. 
But if this causal influence predominantly serves to sustain existing 
practices, then the technology should not be regarded as disruptive. 
Consider wastewater treatment technology, which has not radically 
altered over the last century, but is very important to sustaining many 
contemporary social practices. In our present era, we are unlikely to 
regard this as an SDT, even if we heavily rely on it. Instead, since the 
technology consolidates a significant status quo, it is more aptly 
described as a Socially Sustaining Technology (SST). 
5. What grounds technosocial disruptiveness? Seven criteria 
I have covered various basic conceptual distinctions that pertain to 
SDTs and technosocial disruption, which clarify what makes technolo-
gies socially disruptive. My method has been to analyze and integrate 
extant colloquial and technical discourses on disruption, with the aim of 
arriving at an understanding of disruption that advances scholarly un-
derstanding of technology’s social implications. Taking one step further 
in the direction of conceptual engineering, I will now distil from the 
foregoing analysis seven criteria that ground a technology’s tech-
nosocial disruptiveness, with the aim of generating a quasi-technical 
concept of “SDTs”. 
As a preliminary, let me outline how these criteria should be un-
derstood. First, it should be acknowledged that social disruptiveness is 
not an all or nothing affair. Some technologies are more socially 
disruptive than others. The seven criteria outlined below do not 
constitute a set of necessary conditions, but a set of contributing factors: 
not all of them have to be fulfilled for a technology to be classified as an 
SDT, though some certainly do. Secondly, different technologies can be 
disruptive in different ways. Accordingly, the criteria on which a given 
SDT scores particularly high may differ per technology. The more 
criteria are fulfilled, and the higher the degree to which they are, the 
more disruptive we may take a technology to be. Thirdly, not all criteria 
outlined below may be equally important. For instance, depth of impacts 
(a) is undoubtedly a core criterion of SDTs; reversibility (f) is arguably a 
subsidiary, or derivative, criterion. Yet, in other respects the respective 
contribution of a-g to a technology’s disruptiveness is still up for debate. 
Fourthly, the set of criteria outlined below is not meant to be compre-
hensive. There may be further criteria relevant to designating a tech-
nology as socially disruptive, and outlining them will be an important 
task for future work on SDTs. What the set below does aspire to capture 
are some of the core criteria that paradigm SDTs should satisfy. 
5.1. Depth of impacts 
Depth of impacts denotes the extent to which SDTs affect deeply held 
beliefs, values, social norms, and basic human capacities. Paradigmatic 
SDTs challenge basic categories and concepts of thought, such the 
distinction between virtual and real, natural and artificial, or dead and 
alive. They affect basic human practices, fundamental concepts, onto-
logical distinctions, and go to the heart of our human self- 
understanding. For instance, AI challenges notions like agency, re-
sponsibility, intelligence, and reasoning, which have long been believed 
to be uniquely human. Genome editing raises foundational questions 
about human enhancement, human finitude, species boundaries, hy-
bridization and (de-)extinction. Robotics puts pressure on views about 
basic moral and legal status. All of these are instances of “deep disrup-
tion”, whereby fundamental values and previously held certainties are 
challenged. 
Deep disruptions may be contrasted with disruptions whose impli-
cations only scratch the surface of entrenched social structures, or do not 
affect basic concepts. Consider the floppy disk, which was hailed as a 
paradigm disruptive innovation by Bower and Christensen [21]. While 
floppy disks have certainly proved disruptive to industry and consumers, 
they did not challenge fundamental concepts, or overturn basic practices 
of social interaction, nor did they alter the nature of work, or affect 
political structures. 
5.2. Range of impacts 
The social impact of technologies can be more or less extensive. Some 
technologies are very disruptive in a given domain (e.g. the domain of 
politics, medicine, or the military), but do not seem to have substantial 
impact beyond that domain. They are, with Schuelke-Leech’s [3] term, 
first-order disruptions. For instance, exoskeleton technologies may serve 
to strengthen the endurance and fighting capabilities of soldiers and 
could have a disruptive impact on the way that military operations are 
organized. However, at least at present, the promise of using exo-
skeletons in non-military settings is less obvious; plausibly, the impact of 
this emerging technology will be restricted to the military domain. By 
contrast, blockchain is an emerging technology of which the anticipated 
impacts range across several domains, including finance, government 
administration and industrial production. Hence, blockchain has clear 
potential to be second-order disruptive. The variety of domains affected 
counts towards the disruptiveness of a technology: the more ubiquitous 
its domains of impact, the more disruptive we may take a technology to 
be. 
5.3. Valence of impacts 
What matters for the disruptiveness of technologies, too, is the 
valence ascribed to their impacts. Paradigmatic SDTs compromise a 
state-of-affairs that is regarded as significant, because it touches upon 
matters that are valued in society. Indeed, paradigmatic SDTs affect key 
determinants of the quality of society, nature, and human life. Consider 
the artificial womb, with its potential to disrupt existing family struc-
tures and gender roles. These phenomena are dear to many people; their 
disruption is likely to provoke strong sentiments and to be regarded as 
either very good or very bad. By contrast, innovations in battery tech-
nology are unlikely to provoke similarly strong sentiments, even if 
batteries are omnipresent in technical artifacts and their improvement 
constitutes a major innovation, as seen through the lens of R&D. The 
intensity of the affective disturbance provoked by a given technosocial 
disruption might be taken as a measure of disruptiveness. 
5.4. Ethical salience of impacts 
Paradigmatic SDTs do not only trigger strong emotional responses, 
but also have impacts that are morally significant. They raise ethical 
dilemmas, create value conflicts, provoke moral confusion and uncer-
tainty, and bring issues to the fore that current systems of ethics are not 
well equipped to handle. To name just a few examples, genome editing 
provokes heated moral debates over human enhancement. Big data 
analytics raises issues of privacy that challenge current legal and moral 
frameworks. The algorithmic bias produced by AI systems is widely 
regarded as a cause for ethical concern. Sex robots create moral confu-
sion regarding the moral permissibility of sexual practices involving 
them. In each of these cases SDTs foreground unresolved ethical issues. 
The amount of ethical reflection an emerging technology invites can be 
regarded as an indicator of the technology’s disruptiveness. 
While all technologies that are described as “disruptive” are likely to 
be associated with some ethical issues, these issues may be more or less 
pronounced. Consider single serve plastic coffee capsules, which dis-
rupted the coffee market in the 1990s. This technology had effects on the 
labor market and on plastic waste production, which are related to social 
and ethical values such as well-being and sustainability. That said, the 
ease of preparing coffee is not a strong determinant of the quality of 
society. The ethical component of disruptions provoked by paradigmatic 
SDTs is much more salient. 
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5.5. Extent of uncertainty 
The impacts of SDTs are typically sudden, surprising, and difficult to 
anticipate. New technologies get entangled with sociohistorical trends 
and recombine with other emerging technologies, mutually trans-
forming each other in the ensuing process. The uncertainty engendered 
by the lack of foreseeability of this process adds to the technology’s 
disruptiveness. Generally speaking, the more difficult it is to anticipate 
its ensuing technosocial dynamics, the more disruptive we may take a 
technology to be. Moreover, apart from predictive uncertainty, SDTs 
also provoke other kinds of uncertainty, such as conceptual ambiguity 
and contestation, moral confusion, and moral disagreement [33,34]. 
These species of moral uncertainty, too, are characteristic of tech-
nosocial disruption. Deep disruptions destabilize social, institutional, 
and moral practices. They take away our epistemic and moral bearings – 
and the greater the extent they do so, the more disruptive we may take 
them to be. Furthermore, contrary to paradigmatic moral revolutions 
[42], moral disruptions may not be intentionally driven. They are likely 
to be associated with greater uncertainty, and specific efforts at 
sense-making and settling into new routines, while engaging with new 
social practices. 
5.6. Pace of change 
A defining aspect of disruption as a mode of change is its pace. 
Technologies may serve to inhibit, or to accelerate social change. SDTs 
are on the side of acceleration: disruptions typically occur rapidly. This 
accords with common usage: disruptions are often regarded as the 
counterpart of gradual change. For instance, Boucher et al. [12] describe 
disruption as “a specific form of change which occurs relatively quickly 
or dramatically.” In this respect, disruptive change can be partly 
opposed to transformative change, which also subsumes incremental, 
slow-moving processes. While transformation foregrounds the structural 
nature of change, disruption foregrounds its speediness, suddenness, and 
disorderliness. Conceptually, the more rapidly the technosocial change 
it engenders occurs, the more disruptive an SDT may be taken to be. 
5.7. Reversibility of impacts 
A final determinant of social disruptiveness is the reversibility of 
impacts: the more irreversible and permanent the impacts of SDTs, the 
more disruptive they may be taken to be. Conceptually, irreversibility 
has an even stronger link with the notion of transformation. Indeed, in 
their recent work on Transformative AI (TAI), Gruetzemacher and 
Whittlestone [13] argue that irreversibility is the hallmark of trans-
formative change, and characterize transformation as the practically 
irreversible change in trajectories of human life and progress. Yet 
paradigmatic technosocial disruptions, too, are associated with changes 
that cannot be easily made undone. Think of “deep disruptions” 
regarding our human nature, which transform fundamental modes of 
human sensemaking and being-in-the-world. Or think of technologies – 
such as solar radiation management – that hold to promise to drastically 
alter our planetary environment in ways that cannot easily be made 
undone, and have the potential to alter the trajectory of human civili-
zation for centuries to come. Irreversibility has ethical significance: the 
extent to which impacts are reversible is an important determinant of 
their ethical evaluation. Accordingly, irreversible changes will be typi-
cally regarded as more ethically salient (d). 
A-g are interlocking criteria: they constitute different facets that can 
be integrated in the complex concept of “SDT”. Highlighting these 
criteria serves to illuminate how this concept differs from “disruption” as 
it has been understood in earlier discourses. Furthermore, it helps to 
understand why disentangling these concepts is important for future 
scholarship. Disruption is high on the agenda of policymakers (e.g. [43], 
whose cautionary approach with attempts at regulation clearly differs 
from how disruptive innovators approach the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, it is high on the agenda of ethicists, especially those with 
an interest in emerging technologies. As Floridi and Strait [44]: 79) note, 
periods of disruption pertain to “rapid changes in both the technology’s 
development and uncertainty from society about how a technology or 
artefact should be used. This is the period of time when interpretive 
flexibility, or the capability of relevant social groups to impart different 
meanings, expectations, and uses of a technological artefact, is at its 
highest.” Such uncertainty and flexibility poses a challenge to ethical 
foresight methodologies. To improve these ethical methods, thorough-
going engagement with technology’s disruptiveness, understood in 
terms of the conceptual framework outlined here, is called for. 
6. Conclusion 
Combining the criteria (a-g) we may characterize archetypical SDTs 
as technologies that have deep, important, ethically salient and wide- 
ranging impacts, that occur rapidly, provoke uncertainty and cannot 
be easily reversed. Several technologies that have historically become 
entrenched in society, such as the printing press, electric lighting and the 
internet fit these criteria to a substantial degree and may therefore be 
justifiably typified as historical SDTs. But as noted, SDTs can also be 
identified on the basis of their potential. For several currently emerging 
technologies, such as AI, machine learning, CRISPR-Cas9, the artificial 
womb and various others, a good case can be made that they satisfy the 
abovementioned criteria to a substantial degree and can thus be justi-
fiably regarded as emerging SDTs. 
The present article has made first steps towards articulating a con-
ceptual framework that can be used to further analyze SDTs and reflect 
on the nature of technosocial disruption. It has done so by relating SDTs 
to the existing framework of disruption advanced by disruptive inno-
vation theory, and subsequently by clarifying several of the features and 
conceptual intricacies of the broader notion of “technosocial disrup-
tion”, such as the differences between the concepts of “disruption”, 
“deep disruption” “transformation”, “disruptor”, “disruptee”, and 
“disruptiveness”. Of course, this is merely conceptual groundwork; the 
philosophical and ethical meat on the bones must come from case- 
studies of technosocial disruption. Such analyses hold great promise 
for future scholarship in the philosophy of technology.2 
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